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TOO MANY REMEDIES OR NOT ENOUGH: 
BALANCING WAGE THEFT AND OTHER PUBLIC 
POLICY CONCERNS IN VORIS V. LAMPERT 
Tina Kuang* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The term “wage theft” refers to an employer’s failure to pay its 
employees their earned wages.1 It includes a variety of different pay 
violations—including paying employees less than minimum wage, 
failing to pay overtime, making improper deductions, and refusing to 
pay employees altogether.2 Despite strong protections in the Labor 
Code, wage theft is a widespread problem in California.3 Even with 
regulations in place, “the probability of being caught for wage theft is 
so low that it makes economic sense for employers to commit wage 
theft on a massive scale.”4 A 2013 report from the National 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., English, University 
of Oregon, 2018. Thank you to Professor Bryan Hull for his invaluable feedback and guidance, 
Alex Hider for being my sounding board and second pair of eyes, and my mom for her endless love 
and support. 
 1. Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., Hollow Victories: The Crisis in Collecting Unpaid Wages for 
California’s Workers, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, 4 (2013), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/HollowVictories.pdf. See generally KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN 
AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT 7 (2009) (Bobo’s book popularized the term “wage theft,” which she defined as 
“when an employer violates the law and deprives a worker of legally mandated wages”). 
 2. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 4; see Eli Wolfe, ‘We’re Being Robbed’: Wage Theft in 
California Often Goes Unpunished by State, KQED (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/
11780059/were-being-robbed-california-employers-who-cheat-workers-often-not-held-
accountable-by-state. 
 3. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 4; Wolfe, supra note 2. 
 4. Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 97 (2018); id. 
at 103 (“Economists have long sought to explain non-compliance with wage and hour laws as a 
rational profit-maximizing decision employers make in response to low enforcement rates and weak 
penalties. In their seminal 1979 article, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, Orley 
Ashenfelter and Robert Smith theorized that an employer’s decision to pay less than the minimum 
wage involves a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the probability of detection, the 
expected penalties that would occur if detected, and the profit the employer expects to make by 
violating the law.” (citing Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum 
Wage Law, 87 J. POL. ECON. 333, 335–36 (1979))); see, e.g., Kate Taylor, McDonald’s Is Paying 
Out $26 Million to Thousands of Workers After Settling a Wage-Theft Lawsuit, with Employees 
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Employment Law Project (“NELP Report”)5 estimates that “654,914 
workers in Los Angeles face one pay-related violation” in any given 
week.6 In fact, “[w]age theft is a far bigger problem than bank 
robberies, convenience store robberies, street and highway robberies, 
and gas station robberies combined.”7 Yet, despite its prevalence, 
wage theft receives very little national political attention; “[i]t is a 
crisis unfolding largely outside of public view.”8 
The two main ways employees recover stolen wages in California 
are by (1) pursuing a claim with the California Labor Commissioner 
(also called the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement); or (2) 
filing a lawsuit.9 However, even when employees successfully pursue 
their wage claims, winning a judgment is often just a “hollow 
victory.”10 Many employers who are found liable for wage violations 
have no intention to pay their employees the stolen wages, going so 
far as to abandon, transfer, or sell their businesses—sometimes even 
before the judgment is delivered.11 By doing so, employers no longer 
have to worry about their assets being seized to satisfy the judgment.12 
Although pay violations, and the subsequent difficulty collecting 
stolen wages, are “shockingly high” in low-wage industries,13 another 
 
Getting Checks for as Much as $3,900 in Lost Wages, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2020, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/mcdonalds-to-pay-26-million-after-settling-wage-theft-lawsuit-
2020-10 (“Roughly 34,000 McDonald’s employees at corporate-owned locations across California 
will receive checks as part of [a $26 million settlement to a wage theft lawsuit]. Workers will 
receive checks for an average of $333.52, with some receiving as much as $3,927.91 . . . .”). 
 5. The NELP Report is based on a comprehensive review of records released by the Labor 
Commissioner between 2008 and 2011. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. Id. at 4; see CAL. LAB. COMM’R’S OFF., 2017–2018 FISCAL YEAR REPORT ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUREAU OF FIELD ENFORCEMENT 2 (2018), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse
/BOFE_LegReport2018.pdf (“The US Department of Labor reported in 2014 that the minimum 
wage law is violated in California 372,000 times per week and that more than one in 10 workers in 
California is paid less than the minimum wage. An often-cited 2010 study by the UCLA Labor 
Center found that frontline workers in Los Angeles County lose $26.2 million per week in stolen 
wages.”). 
 7. Ross Eisenbrey, Wage Theft Is a Bigger Problem than Other Theft—But Not Enough Is 
Done to Protect Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.epi.org/publication/wa
ge-theft-bigger-problem-theft-protect/. 
 8. Hallett, supra note 4, at 102. 
 9. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 7. 
 10. Id. at 15. 
 11. Id. at 14; Wolfe, supra note 2. 
 12. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 14, 17. 
 13. Id. at 4. 
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industry faces the same problem: startups.14 The opportunity to create 
the next big thing has “long lured ambitious entrepreneurs into shiny 
co-working spaces and startup accelerators” in Silicon Valley, but the 
reality is that most startups fail.15 These failures can be crushing for 
all those involved.16 Not only does the death of a startup mean the loss 
of a job and the death of a dream, it also means a lack of funds to 
compensate employees for work they have already put in.17 Although 
the practice of withholding wages is illegal, it is a rather common 
problem when startup founders “put off paying employees as they wait 
out their next round of funding.”18 If the funding falls through, there 
is often no money left to pay employees the wages they have already 
earned.19 
That is what happened to plaintiff Brett Voris (“Voris”) in Voris 
v. Lampert.20 Voris helped defendant Greg Lampert (“Lampert”) 
launch three startup ventures with the promise of receiving payment 
of wages and stock at a later date.21 Voris was eventually fired from 
all three companies and never received those wages, so he sued his 
former employers.22 Voris prevailed against all three companies, but 
he was unable to collect on the judgments because the startups lacked 
funds and assets.23 Thereafter, Voris focused his efforts on Lampert 
and sought to hold him personally responsible for the unpaid wages 
under the theory of common law conversion.24 
In a five to two decision, the California Supreme Court held there 
could be no tort conversion claim based on the nonpayment of 
wages.25 In doing so, the majority opinion distinguished the 
conversion of unpaid wages from other cases involving the conversion 
of money, opining that (1) employees do not have a property interest 
in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages do not involve “a specific 
 
 14. Marisa Kendall, When Startups Fail: What Happens When the Cash Runs Out, MERCURY 
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016, 8:41 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/10/02/when-startups-fail-
what-happens-when-the-cash-runs-out/. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019). 
 21. Id. at 286. 
 22. Id. at 286–87. 
 23. Id. at 287. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 286, 299. 
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sum capable of identification,” a requirement for the conversion of 
money.26 However, the dissenting opinion found precedent to be 
indistinguishable and reached the opposite conclusion: that (1) 
employees do have a property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) 
unpaid wages can, and do, involve a “specific sum capable of 
identification.”27 
Based on the majority and the dissent’s conflicting interpretations 
of the same cases, this Comment argues that both opinions were driven 
by public policy concerns instead of the sound application of 
precedent. Part II presents the facts and procedural history of the case, 
and Part III explores the majority and dissent’s reasoning as to why a 
conversion claim is or is not the appropriate remedy to address wage 
theft. In Part IV, Sections IV.A and IV.B contend that both opinions 
are rooted in public policy concerns because the distinction between 
this case and precedent seems rather arbitrary. Section IV.C observes 
that while Voris can recover under the existing remedies, not all 
victims of wage theft can recover their stolen wages without 
maintaining a conversion claim. Finally, Section IV.D argues that 
conversion based on the nonpayment of wages should not be 
categorically barred and offers two elements to limit the scope of a 
conversion claim for unpaid wages that address the majority’s policy 
concerns described in Section IV.B. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Voris Prevails in His Lawsuits Against All Three Companies 
In November 2005, Voris joined Lampert and Ryan Bristol 
(“Bristol”) to launch a real estate investment company, Premier Ten 
Thirty One Capital (“PropPoint”).28 Voris provided both marketing 
and advertising services to PropPoint.29 Lampert and Bristol later 
recruited Voris to do similar work for two other startup ventures, 
Liquiddium Capital Partners, LLC (“Liquiddium”) and Sportfolio, 
Inc. (“Sportfolio”).30 In exchange for his work at all three companies, 
Lampert and Bristol promised Voris later payment of wages, stock, or 
 
 26. Id. at 290–94. 
 27. See id. at 300–03 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 286 (majority opinion). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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both.31 In exchange for additional equity, Voris also invested money 
in PropPoint and Liquiddium.32 
In fall 2006, Voris discovered alleged financial improprieties by 
Lampert and Bristol.33 When Voris voiced his concerns, Bristol and 
Lampert criticized his work performance and accused him of stealing 
company money.34 Voris was eventually terminated from all three 
companies.35 The startups never paid Voris the wages or stock they 
owed him, except for a portion of compensation from PropPoint 
during his employment.36 
Voris sued the three companies, Lampert, and Bristol.37 He 
alleged twenty-four causes of action in the operative complaint, 
“including breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, fraud, failure to 
pay wages in violation of the Labor Code, conversion, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith, and breach of fiduciary duty.”38 The 
relief sought by Voris included “$91,000 in unpaid wages from 
PropPoint, $66,000 from Sportfolio, and various percentages of equity 
in all three companies.”39 In addition, he “sought to hold both Lampert 
and Bristol personally liable on all counts based on [the] theory of alter 
ego liability.”40 
“[O]n the claims against Sportfolio for breach of contract, failure 
to pay wages, failure to pay for services rendered, and conversion of 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Voris v. Lampert, No. B265747, 2017 WL 1153334, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017), 
aff’d, 446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019). 
 35. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 286. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 287. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. Alter ego liability allows for the injured party to hold shareholders personally 
responsible for the debts or actions of a corporation but requires the plaintiff to “pierce the corporate 
veil.” Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(“Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its stockholders, 
officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. A corporate identity 
may be disregarded—the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege 
justifies holding the equitable ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation. 
Under the alter ego doctrine, then, when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent 
a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the 
corporate entity and deem the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons or organizations actually 
controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable owners. The alter ego doctrine prevents 
individuals or other corporations from misusing the corporate laws by the device of a sham 
corporate entity formed for the purpose of committing fraud or other misdeeds.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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stock,” the jury found in Voris’s favor and awarded him $70,782 in 
damages.41 On the claims against Liquiddium for breach of contract 
and conversion of stock, the jury also found for Voris and awarded 
him $100,218.42 This amount included “$2,500 in punitive damages 
on the stock conversion claim.”43 In a bench trial against PropPoint, 
who did not enter an appearance, “the court ruled in Voris’s favor on 
the claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, failure to pay wages 
in violation of the Labor Code, and conversion of stock and wages” 
and “awarded Voris $171,951 in damages, plus prejudgment interest, 
costs, and attorney fees.”44 
B.  Unable to Collect on the Judgments Because the Companies 
Lacked Funds and Assets, Voris Focuses on His Action Against 
Lampert 
Despite prevailing against all three companies, Voris was unable 
to collect on the judgments.45 PropPoint, Liquiddium, and Sportfolio 
all lacked funds and assets, so instead, Voris turned his efforts toward 
Lampert, who “allegedly ran down the companies’ accounts and 
mismanaged the startups into insolvency.”46 
At the start of litigation, Lampert “successfully demurred to the 
claims of fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith.”47 
The trial court then granted Lampert’s motion for summary judgment 
on the remaining claims because Voris failed to adequately support his 
alter ego liability allegations.48 The court noted that “[i]n an 
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and 
reversed in part”; it upheld the ruling that Voris’s claims of alter ego 
liability were insufficient because he failed to “identify supporting 
facts,” but reversed with respect to the conversion claims because 
“individual officers may be held personally liable for their intentional 
torts ‘without any need to pierce the corporate veil.’”49 
 
 41. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 287. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; id. at 299 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 287 (majority opinion). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.; see also Voris v. Lampert, No. B234116, 2014 WL 2119993, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 
22, 2014). 
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On remand before the trial court, Lampert moved for judgment 
on the pleadings on the stock and wage conversion claims, “argu[ing] 
that Voris failed to allege a sufficient deprivation of ownership interest 
in the stocks and that California law does not recognize a claim for the 
conversion of wages.”50 The trial court granted the motions, and again, 
the court of appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part.51 
In a second unpublished decision, all three justices agreed that the 
“stock conversion claims should be permitted to proceed,” relying on 
a “uniform rule of law that shares of stock in a company are subject to 
an action in conversion.”52 However, “the justices were divided on 
whether Voris had pleaded a cognizable claim” for wage conversion.53 
The majority concluded that a conversion tort claim based on the 
nonpayment of wages was not warranted by existing case law or policy 
considerations; “the Labor Code already requires prompt payment of 
a discharged employee and authorizes penalties for noncompliance.”54 
The majority worried that if Voris’s claim were allowed to continue, 
“any claimed wage and hour violation would give rise to tort liability 
for conversion as well as the potential for punitive damages.”55 In 
contrast, the concurring and dissenting justice “opined that 
‘employees have a vested property interest in their earned wages, that 
failure to pay them is a legal wrong that interferes with this property 
interest, and that an action for conversion may therefore be brought to 
recover unpaid wages.’”56 
The California Supreme Court granted de novo review to address 
the disagreement.57 
III.  REASONING OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
The sole issue before the court was whether a terminated 
employee could bring an action against his employer’s part-owner to 
hold the part-owner personally responsible for improperly 
withholding the employee’s wages under the common law theory of 
 
 50. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 287. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; see also Voris v. Lampert, No. B265747, 2017 WL 1153334, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2017), aff’d, 446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019). 
 53. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 287. 
 54. Id. at 288 (citation omitted); see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 201, 203 (West, Westlaw through 
Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 55. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 288. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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conversion.58 Justice Kruger wrote the majority opinion, which 
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal; Chief Justice Cantil-
Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, and Groban concurred.59 Justice 
Cuéllar wrote the dissenting opinion, and Justice Liu concurred.60 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion held that “[t]he conversion tort is not the 
right fit for the wrong that Voris alleges, nor is it the right fix for the 
deficiencies Voris perceives in the existing system of remedies for 
wage nonpayment.”61 It found that precedent did not support allowing 
a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.62 Further, because 
extensive remedies already existed to combat wage theft in California, 
the majority opinion did not want to “duplicate [those] remedies” with 
conversion.63 
1.  The Existing Remedial Scheme 
The majority began its analysis with an “overview of existing law 
governing the payment of [employee] wages.”64 First, the majority 
emphasized that the employment relationship is “‘fundamentally 
contractual,’ meaning it is governed in the first instance by the mutual 
promises made between employer and employee.”65 An action for 
breach of contract is the “usual remedy” for when a promise is 
broken.66 Accordingly, an action for breach of contract is also the 
“usual remedy” for when an employer breaches the promise to pay its 
employee for services rendered.67 Even if there is no “explicit promise 
for payment, the law will imply one” and authorize recovery if it is 
clear the parties “understood the employee was not volunteering 
[their] services free of charge.”68 
 
 58. See id. at 286. 
 59. Id. at 286, 299. 
 60. Id. at 285. 
 61. Id. at 286. 
 62. Id. at 290–94. 
 63. Id. at 295. 
 64. Id. at 288. 
 65. Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988)). 
 66. Id. (quoting Glendale City Emps.’ Ass’n v. City of Glendale, 540 P.2d 609, 619 (Cal. 
1975)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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To supplement those contract remedies with additional worker 
protections, the Legislature enacted several statutory remedies “to 
ensure employees receive prompt and full compensation for their 
labor.”69 That resulted in “a mass of legislation touching upon almost 
every aspect of the employer-employee relationship.”70 
The majority noted that Voris relied on these existing contract and 
statutory remedies to obtain judgments against PropPoint, 
Liquiddium, and Sportfolio.71 However, Voris was ultimately unable 
to collect on the judgments because Lampert deliberately managed the 
startups into insolvency.72 Therefore, he wanted the court to 
supplement existing remedies “with a common law cause of action for 
conversion of unpaid wages.”73 And despite the fact that the obligation 
to pay those wages belonged to his employers (the three startups), 
Voris also wanted the court to recognize a claim against “individual 
officers who have either directed or participated in the employer’s 
failure to pay.”74 Specifically, Voris wanted to hold Lampert 
personally liable under tort law for withholding his earned wages.75 
The majority, and Voris, acknowledged that no precedential California 
decision has recognized a conversion claim based on the nonpayment 
of wages before.76 
2.  Applying Precedent 
Next, the majority addressed precedent, beginning with an 
overview of the conversion tort.77 Conversion is “the wrongful 
exercise of dominion over personal property of another.”78 The 
elements are: “(a) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of 
personal property, (b) defendant’s disposition of property in a manner 
inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights, and (c) resulting 
damages.”79 The majority noted that “absent from this formula is any 
 
 69. Id. at 289. 
 70. Id. (quoting Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 289–90. 
 78. Id. at 290 (quoting 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW: TORTS § 810 (11th 
ed. 2017)). 
 79. Id. (quoting 5 B.E. WITKIN, 5 B.E. WITKIN, supra note 78, § 810). 
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element of wrongful intent or motive; in California, conversion is a 
‘strict liability tort.’”80 Furthermore, “[p]unitive damages are 
recoverable upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression.”81 In 
appropriate circumstances, emotional distress damages are also 
recoverable.82 
With that foundation laid out, the majority applied conversion to 
the nonpayment of wages.83 Although it was once contested, 
“California law now holds that property subject to a conversion claim 
need not be tangible in form,” and money can be the subject of a 
conversion claim if “a specific sum capable of identification is 
involved.”84 However—as explored in Section IV.A—the majority 
differentiated between Voris’s case and other cases involving the 
conversion of money, holding that (1) employees do not have a 
property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages do not 
involve “a specific sum capable of identification.”85 
3.  Rejecting Conversion as Another Remedy 
Along with opining that a conversion claim for unpaid wages is 
unsupported by precedent, the majority declined to expand the scope 
of conversion because there are already “extensive remedies” to 
address the issue: 
An employee seeking recovery of a contractual right to 
payment of wages is, of course, entitled to sue for breach of 
contract or, absent a written agreement, for quantum meruit. 
But that is far from all. The Legislature has repeatedly acted 
to supplement these common law remedies with statutory 
remedies.86 
The majority noted that presently, the Labor Code is the greatest 
defense against the nonpayment of wages and “secures an employee’s 
right to the full and prompt payment of final wages,” regardless of 
whether the employee is terminated or voluntarily quits.87 Under the 
Labor Code, employers who willfully fail to comply with its 
 
 80. Id. (quoting Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 290–94. 
 84. Id. at 290–91. 
 85. Id. at 290–94; see infra Section IV.A. 
 86. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 294–95. 
 87. Id. at 295. 
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requirements are subject to civil penalties.88 The Labor Commissioner 
can require an employer who fails to satisfy a wage judgment or is 
convicted of violating wage laws “to post a bond with the state in order 
to continue doing business in California.”89 If the Labor 
Commissioner fails to “take action despite repeat violations by an 
employer, private individuals can seek a temporary restraining order 
to halt the employer’s business without waiting for the Commissioner 
to enjoin it first.”90 Further, the willful failure to pay wages and the 
denial of valid wage claims are criminal offenses, punishable as 
misdemeanors under the Labor Code.91 
The majority believed the “Labor Code provisions illustrate[how] 
the Legislature can craft rights and remedies that target those 
employers and individual officers who withhold wages willfully and 
repeatedly, and who strategically evade wage judgments.”92 In fact, 
after Voris filed suit, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 588 
(“Senate Bill 588”) in 2015 to address the exact problem that Voris 
alleged: “‘Irresponsible employers [that] may have hidden their cash 
assets, declared bankruptcy, or otherwise become judgment-proof’ to 
avoid adverse wage judgments.”93 
Senate Bill 588 “enact[ed] special provisions for the enforcement 
of judgments against an employer arising from the employer’s 
nonpayment of wages for work performed in [California]” and 
empowered the Labor Commissioner to use “existing remedies 
available to a judgment creditor and to act as a levying officer when 
enforcing a judgment pursuant to a writ of execution.”94 Most 
importantly, Senate Bill 588 added section 558.1 to the Labor Code, 
which allows “[a]ny employer or other person acting on behalf of an 
employer” to be held liable as the employer for their willful conduct 
relating to wage nonpayment.95 Voris’s goal was to directly reach 
“individual officers who are responsible for their companies’ evasion 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 297 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 240 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. 
Sess.)). 
 90. Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 243). 
 91. Id. at 295 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 216). 
 92. Id. at 297. 
 93. Id. (alteration in original). 
 94. S.B. 588, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96.8, 98, 
238, 238.1, 238.2, 238.3, 238.4, 238.5, 558.1 (Senate Bill 588 amended Labor Code section 98 and 
added Labor Code sections 96.8, 238, 238.1, 238.2, 238.3, 238.4, 238.5, and 558.1). 
 95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 588.1. 
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of their established wage obligations”—i.e., Lampert.96 Under Labor 
Code section 558.1, he could do so without alleging Lampert 
converted his unpaid wages.97 Therefore, the majority believed “a 
conversion claim for unpaid wages would largely duplicate [existing] 
remedies” and “serve little purpose.”98 
The majority noted that while the legislative solutions may not be 
perfect, the history of wage-payment regulation in California shows 
that the Legislature has been attentive to the problem of wage theft 
and is working to provide “appropriately tailored relief.”99 A 
conversion claim for unpaid wages is just not the appropriate relief; it 
would “transform a category of contract claims into torts”100 and “pile 
additional measures of tort damages on top of statutory recovery, even 
in cases of good-faith mistake.”101 Because of extensive remedies that 
already exist to combat wage theft in California, the majority declined 
to also allow a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.102 
Nevertheless, the majority agreed that “[t]he full and prompt 
payment of wages is of fundamental importance to the welfare of both 
workers and the State of California.”103 
B.  The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, believed that “[t]he 
doctrinal basis for invoking conversion here is as solid as California’s 
longstanding concern about wage theft.”104 It criticized the majority 
for “acknowledg[ing] but then sidestep[ping]” the fact that “numerous 
plaintiffs have successfully sought compensation for their labor 
through the tort of conversion.”105 The dissent addressed the same 
precedent involving the conversion of money that the majority did, but 
it reached the opposite conclusion: that (1) employees do have a 
property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages can, and 
 
 96. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296. 
 97. CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1; see Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296–98. 
 98. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 295. 
 99. Id. at 298. 
 100. Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87–99 (1974) (asserting that contract 
law is not as neat and tidy as it appears in casebooks because those cases are selected and reported 
to fit preexisting categories of contract law). 
 101. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298–99. 
 102. Id. at 299. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 300 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 299. 
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do, involve a “specific sum capable of identification.”106 Section IV.A 
contrasts the difference between the majority and the dissent’s 
treatment of those same cases.107 While “[t]he majority [found] it 
‘notable’ that no precedential California decision has yet recognized a 
conversion claim based on withholding of wages,” the dissent found 
it more conspicuous that there is no precedential decision refusing to 
recognize such a claim.108 
The dissent disagreed with the majority that conversion was not 
“the right fit for the wrong,” nor “an appropriate remedy,” because 
regardless of how or why the wage theft happened, the financial hit to 
the worker’s income is a heavy burden, and the worker should be able 
to recover their stolen wages.109 “Despite ‘the considerable body of 
statutory law that is specifically designed to directly punish and deter 
employers that fail to satisfy wage judgments,’” the remedies in 
existence at the time Voris filed suit were indisputably inadequate.110 
Therefore, the dissent believed the tort of conversion should be 
available to employees “as a complement to the legislative scheme,” 
which is “consistent with the tort’s broad scope under California law 
and with the manner in which state legislative remedies and the 
common law traditionally interact.”111 A conversion claim for the 
nonpayment of wages would supplement existing legislative remedies 
“to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their . . . 
rights.”112 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
While the majority did not want to duplicate existing remedies, 
the dissent wanted to provide employees with additional remedies to 
combat wage theft.113 Nevertheless, both the majority and the 
dissenting opinions were driven by public policy concerns instead of 
 
 106. See id. at 300–02. 
 107. See infra Section IV.A. 
 108. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 302 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 303. 
 110. Id. at 302. 
 111. Id. at 304. 
 112. Id. (omission in original) (citing Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1990)). 
 113. Compare id. at 295 (majority opinion) (“[A] conversion claim for unpaid wages would 
largely duplicate these remedies and, to that extent, would serve little purpose.”), with id. at 304 
(Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (arguing that the tort claim of conversion should complement the existing 
legislative scheme). 
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the sound application of precedent.114 Despite addressing the very 
same cases, the majority and the dissent reached opposite conclusions 
on whether (1) employees had a property interest in their unpaid 
wages; and (2) unpaid wages involved a “specific sum capable of 
identification.”115 As a result, the distinction between this case and 
other cases involving the conversion of money seems rather arbitrary. 
Instead, other factors influenced the majority and the dissent. While 
the dissent was focused on combatting wage theft, the majority’s 
primary concern was that a conversion claim for unpaid wages would 
essentially duplicate existing remedies while “blurring the common 
law distinction between contract and tort” law and bringing forth 
undesirable features, like strict liability and punitive damages.116 
With the enactment of Senate Bill 588, the majority is correct that 
Voris would be able to hold Lampert personally liable for his stolen 
wages without relying on the conversion tort.117 However, the 
majority failed to consider situations beyond this case where the 
ability to maintain a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages 
may be crucial for an employee to recover their stolen wages.118 To 
help all victims of wage theft, not just Voris, a conversion cause of 
action should be available to recover unpaid wages when (1) the court 
can ascertain the specific sum of money that is owed; and (2) the 
employee can show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant (the employer, employer’s officers, or a third party) acted 
with malice, oppression, or fraud in withholding the employee’s 
wages.119 
A.  The Majority and the Dissent Reached Opposite Conclusions 
Despite Applying the Same Precedent 
1.  Precedent Involving the Conversion of Money 
Although the majority held that employees cannot bring a 
conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages, precedent establishes 
that money can be the subject of a conversion claim if a “specific sum 
 
 114. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
 115. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 290–94 (majority opinion); id. at 299–302 (Cuéllar, J., 
dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 300; see infra Section IV.B. 
 117. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 297–98 (majority opinion); S.B. 588, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2015); infra Section IV.C.1. 
 118. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 119. See infra Section IV.D. 
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capable of identification is involved.”120 For example, “a real estate 
agent may be liable for conversion where he had accepted 
commissions on behalf of himself and a business partner, but refused 
to give the partner his share”;121 “a sales agent may be liable for the 
conversion of proceeds from a consignment sale where the agent did 
not remit any portion of the proceeds to the principal seller”;122 and “a 
client may be liable to an attorney for conversion of attorney fees 
received as part of a settlement, where a lien established the attorney’s 
ownership of the fees in question.”123 To support his argument that 
conversion should be allowed to recover unpaid wages, Voris also 
cited two California cases that involved the conversion of earned 
wages: Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc.124 and Department of 
Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc.125 
Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. held that while Labor Code 
section 351 does not provide a private right of action for an employee 
to recover gratuities withheld by the employer, a common law claim 
such as conversion could potentially be brought against an employer 
who misappropriates gratuities left for its employees.126 The majority 
in Voris v. Lampert agreed that conversion was appropriate in that 
instance because “[w]hen a patron leaves a gratuity for an employee 
(or employees), it arguably qualifies as a specific sum of money, 
belonging to the employee, that is capable of identification.”127 
In UI Video Stores, the court approved a conversion claim 
brought by the Labor Commissioner on behalf of Blockbuster 
employees to recover money unlawfully deducted from their 
paychecks to pay for uniforms.128 After the parties settled, Blockbuster 
mailed individual checks to the employees in the amount of the 
wrongful deductions.129 When a number of checks were returned as 
“undeliverable,” the Labor Commissioner told Blockbuster to deposit 
 
 120. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 291 (citing Haigler v. Donnelly, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (Cal. 1941)). 
 121. Id. (citing Sanowicz v. Bacal, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 529 (Ct. App. 2015)). 
 122. Id. (citing Fischer v. Machado, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 215–16 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
 123. Id. at 291–92 (citing Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Ct. App. 1975)). 
 124. 236 P.3d 346 (Cal. 2010). 
 125. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Lampert, 446 P.3d at 293–94. 
 126. Lu, 236 P.3d at 353 (noting that other remedies, such as common law conversion, may be 
available; however, the court never actually decided the issue). 
 127. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 293. 
 128. UI Video Stores, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459. 
 129. Id. 
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those checks in California’s unpaid wages fund.130 Blockbuster 
refused, and the Labor Commissioner filed a second complaint, 
alleging that the refusal was an unlawful conversion of the checks for 
Blockbuster’s own use.131 The court of appeal reversed summary 
judgment in Blockbuster’s favor, accepting the Labor Commissioner’s 
contention that it had the right to immediate possession of the checks 
as the agent of the state and trustee for the employees.132 The majority 
in Voris v. Lampert noted that “[a]lthough UI Video Stores involved a 
conversion action related to wrongfully withheld wages, it did not 
concern a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.”133 The 
majority also stated that at the time of the action in UI Video Stores 
the checks themselves were “arguably” the property of the employees 
because Blockbuster had already cut and mailed the checks to the 
employees.134 
The claim for conversion of checks addressed in UI Video Stores 
is also authorized by statute: California Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) section 3420 states that “[t]he law applicable to conversion of 
personal property applies to instruments,” including checks.135 The 
UCC also authorizes claims for the conversion of money in other 
circumstances. UCC section 9315, subdivision (a)(1) contains the 
general rule that a security interest survives disposition of the 
collateral, and a person who sells property that is subject to a security 
interest may be liable to the secured party for conversion.136 Often, a 
plaintiff suing under UCC section 3420 or section 9315, subdivision 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 463–64 (“[T]he [Labor Commissioner] need not possess legal title to the property at 
issue to support a cause of action for conversion. A person without legal title to property may 
recover from a converter if the plaintiff is responsible to the true owner, such as in the case of a 
bailee or pledgee of the property.”). 
 133. Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 294 (Cal. 2019) (emphasis added and omitted). 
 134. Id. 
 135. CAL. COM. CODE § 3420 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). However, 
“[t]here can be no conversion action until the check is delivered to the payee because until delivery, 
the payee is not a holder and has no property interest in the check.” Software Design & Application, 
Ltd. v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 764–65 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing CAL. COM. 
CODE § 3420(a)); cf. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 2000) 
(“Once earned, . . . unpaid wages became property to which the employees were entitled.”). 
 136. CAL. COM. CODE § 9315(a)(1), cmt. 2 (“[A] secured party may repossess the collateral 
from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion.”). 
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(a)(1) is seeking money, not the check or the collateral itself.137 Thus, 
in both instances, the plaintiff is essentially bringing a conversion 
claim for money under the applicable statute. 
2.  The Majority’s Application of Precedent 
But despite case law and statutory law allowing conversion 
claims for money, the majority held that Voris could not bring a 
conversion claim for unpaid wages because unpaid wages (1) do not 
involve “a specific sum capable of identification is involved”; and (2) 
are not inherently the property of the employee.138 In the majority’s 
view, past cases that allowed for conversion based on money and 
compensation differ because “specific sums” were involved, and 
unpaid wages do not involve a “specific sum.”139 Thus, employees do 
not have a property interest in their unpaid wages.140 
According to the majority, an employee’s claim to unpaid wages 
differs from other claims involving the conversion of money because 
the “employee’s claim is not that the employer has wrongfully 
exercised dominion over a specifically identifiable pot of money that 
already belongs to the employee.”141 Instead, the employee is claiming 
the employer, or the employer’s officer, “failed to reach into its own 
funds to satisfy [the] debt.”142 The majority noted that in some cases 
of wage nonpayment, the money that the employee would have been 
paid out of may have never existed in the first place, giving an all-too-
familiar example: 
[A] failed start-up that generates no income and thus finds 
itself unable to pay its employees. Because the business 
accounts are empty, there would not be any identifiable 
monies for the employer to convert. No one would dispute 
that the start-up is indebted to its employees. But only in the 
realm of fiction could a court conclude that the business, by 
 
 137. Id. (“In many cases, a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security 
interest, and the secured party’s only right will be to proceeds.”). But in some cases, a secured party 
might actually seek non-cash collateral for the purpose of foreclosing on it. Id. 
 138. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 290–94. 
 139. See id. at 291–92. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 292. 
 142. Id. 
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failing to earn the money needed to pay wages, has somehow 
converted that nonexistent money to its own use.143 
What distinguishes the conversion of unpaid wages from other 
cases involving the conversion of money is the fact that the money 
“may never have existed in the first place.”144 
The majority also rejected the argument that unpaid wages are the 
property of the employee, and therefore, the nonpayment of wages 
should simply be treated as conversion of property.145 To support this 
contention, Voris relied on language found in Cortez v. Purolator Air 
Filtration Products Co.,146 which stated that “earned wages that are 
due and payable pursuant to section 200 et seq. of the Labor Code 
are . . . the property of the employee who has given his or her labor to 
the employer in exchange for that property.”147 Despite the fact that 
the court in Cortez explicitly says earned wages are the property of the 
employee, the majority held that the language “concerned the 
availability of a restitutionary remedy under the Unfair Competition 
Law (UCL)” and only applied in that specific context.148 Further, UCL 
awards “encompass quantifiable sums one person owes to another” 
while there was no identifiable sum in Voris’s case.149 
Because unpaid wages are not a “specific sum capable of 
identification,” nor the property of the employee, the majority held 
that Voris did not have a property interest in the money and could not 
maintain a conversion claim for his unpaid wages.150 
3.  The Dissent’s Application of Precedent 
Although the dissent analyzed the same cases as the majority, it 
reached the opposite conclusion: that (1) employees do have a 
property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages can, and 
do, involve a “specific sum capable of identification.”151 The majority 
faulted the dissent for seeing the other cases involving the conversion 
of money as “functionally indistinguishable from this one” because 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 292–93. 
 146. 999 P.2d 706 (Cal. 2000). 
 147. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
 148. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 292. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 291–92. 
 151. Id. at 300–02 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
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“all of [the] cases involve, at some level, a claim to money earned as 
compensation for performing a service.”152 However, even if the past 
cases can be distinguished to a certain degree, the dissent highlights 
just how arbitrary the distinctions are. 
The dissent observed that Voris could properly maintain a 
conversion claim to recover his money if Lampert had exercised 
dominion over his real estate commissions,153 if Lampert were his 
agent and failed to pay him proceeds from the sale of cosigned 
goods,154 or if Voris were an attorney seeking to recover fees from a 
client’s award.155 The dissent also noted that “Voris successfully 
invoked conversion in this case to recover the [part] of his 
compensation that consist[ed] of stock.”156 It was only with respect to 
his unpaid wages that the majority decided conversion was no longer 
the right fit.157 
Citing Cortez, the dissent agreed with Voris that unpaid wages 
are the employee’s property: “‘[o]nce earned, those unpaid wages 
became property to which the employees were entitled.’ Indeed, they 
are ‘as much the property of the employee who has given his or her 
labor to the employer in exchange for that property as is property a 
person surrenders through an unfair business practice.’”158 The latter 
type of property could surely be subject to a conversion action.159 The 
dissent argued that the exchange of labor for money is what causes 
“unpaid wages to become the worker’s property[,] even when those 
funds are still [possessed by] the employer[].”160 Refuting the 
majority’s argument that the funds may not have existed in the first 
place, the dissent urged that even if “the unpaid wages [are] 
commingled with the employer’s general funds,” it “does not 
disqualify them as property that may be converted, so long as the sum 
owed is specific and definite.”161 And to establish the first element of 
 
 152. Id. at 292 (majority opinion). 
 153. Id. at 299 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (citing Sanowicz v. Bacal, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 529 
(Ct. App. 2015)). 
 154. Id. (citing Fischer v. Machado, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 215–16 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
 155. Id. (citing Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Ct. App. 1975)). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 300 (citing Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 709, 715 
(Cal. 2000)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 301. 
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the conversion tort,162 it is enough for a plaintiff “to show [their] 
ownership or right to possession of personal property’”; “[n]o 
extensive discourse on its nature as ‘property’ is required.”163 
An action for unpaid wages is not just an “action[] for a particular 
amount of money owed in exchange for contractual performance,” as 
the majority would suggest.164 After all, “wages are not ordinary 
debts.”165 The court explained that “because of the economic position 
of the average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages for 
the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is essential to the 
public welfare that he receive his pay when it is due.”166 With that in 
mind, the dissent opined that employees have a property interest in 
their wages and the right to bring a conversion action to recover 
them.167 Although “Voris’s plight does not precisely resemble the kind 
of wage theft too often afflicting lower-income workers, Voris has not 
been paid what the courts have determined he is owed—and no one 
disputes this.”168 In that sense, there is a “specific sum” involved—
$70,782 from the judgment against Sportfolio, $100,218 from 
Liquiddium, and $171,951 from PropPoint.169 The dissent also refuted 
the majority’s analysis of UI Video Stores, which stated that “the 
[Labor Commissioner] could have brought a conversion action for 
unpaid wages because it was empowered to collect such sums on 
behalf of the affected employees.”170 The dissent did not understand 
“why a state agency [could] sue for conversion of unpaid wages on 
behalf of the workers who earned those wages, but” the workers 
themselves are “barred from asserting that conversion cause of action 
directly.”171 
 
 162. Id. at 290 (majority opinion) (“As it has developed in California, the tort comprises three 
elements: ‘(a) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of personal property, (b) defendant’s 
disposition of property in a manner inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights, and (c) resulting 
damages.’” (quoting WITKIN, supra note 78, § 810)). 
 163. Id. at 301 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (citing WITKIN, supra note 78, § 810). 
 164. Id. at 300 (alteration in original). 
 165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 740 (Cal. 1948)). 
 166. Id. (quoting In re Trombley, 193 P.2d at 740). 
 167. Id. at 300–01. 
 168. Id. at 300. 
 169. See id. at 287 (majority opinion). 
 170. Id. at 301 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 171. Id. 
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In wage cases, plaintiffs “have routinely included a claim for 
conversion”172 and other jurisdictions have recognized wage 
conversion claims.173 In the dissent’s view, there was no reason to 
distinguish this case from other cases involving the conversion of 
money, especially when earned wages are the property of the 
employee.174 
B.  Instead of the Sound Application of Precedent, Both Opinions 
Were Heavily Influenced by Different Public Policy Concerns 
Despite addressing the same cases, the majority and the dissent 
reached opposite conclusions.175 Instead, other factors influenced the 
opposing opinions more than the sound application of precedent. The 
dissent’s clear focus was combatting wage theft by giving workers 
access to as many remedies as possible.176 But for the majority, it was 
the concern that allowing a conversion claim for unpaid wages would 
largely duplicate existing remedies, while opening the door to 
undesirable features inherent to the conversion tort.177 
1.  Wage Theft 
Along with the legal analysis, the dissenting opinion expressed 
clear concern for workers who have had, or will have, their wages 
stolen.178 For example, the dissent noted that: 
A recent study estimated that minimum wage violations 
alone cost California workers nearly $2 billion per year. 
 
 172. Id. at 302; see, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 562 n.3 (Cal. 2007) (conversion 
claim for unpaid overtime); Falk v. Child.’s Hosp. L.A., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 688 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(claim for “[c]onversion and theft of labor” for failure to timely pay wages); On-Line Power, Inc. 
v. Mazur, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 698, 699 (Ct. App. 2007) (conversion claim for unpaid wages); Dunlap 
v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614, 615 (Ct. App. 2006) (claim for “conversion and theft of 
labor”). 
 173. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 302 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting); Sims v. AT&T Mobility Servs. 
LLC, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]here is clear authority under California 
law that employees have a vested property interest in the wages that they earn, failure to pay them 
is a legal wrong that interferes with the employee’s title in the wages, and an action for conversion 
can therefore be brought to recover unpaid wages.”); see also Lampert, 446 P.3d at 289 n.6 
(majority opinion) (majority recognizing that other jurisdictions have allowed a cause of action for 
conversion based on unpaid wages). 
 174. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 301–02 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 175. See id. at 290–94 (majority opinion); id. at 300–02 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 176. See id. at 304. 
 177. See id. at 295–96 (majority opinion). 
 178. See generally id. at 299–304 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (discussing the economic and societal 
harm done to workers that have or will have their wages stolen). 
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When workers cannot collect wages they are owed, they are 
unable to pay for food, housing, or other bills. They spend 
less overall, slowing local economies and decreasing tax 
revenue for state and local governments. And employers who 
fail to pay wages in full and on time create an uneven playing 
field in which law-abiding businesses are unable to compete. 
What happened to Voris, in effect, leads to a badly distorted 
and fundamentally unfair marketplace for both labor and 
consumers. Even if Voris’s plight does not precisely 
resemble the kind of wage theft too often afflicting lower-
income workers, Voris has not been paid what the courts 
have determined he is owed—and no one disputes this.179 
Rather than focusing on Voris’s specific situation, the dissent 
considered broadly the issue of wage theft in California and all its 
potential victims.180 After all, most victims of wage theft do not look 
like Voris. They are often workers in low-wage industries, such as 
“retail, restaurant and grocery stores; domestic work and homecare; 
manufacturing, construction, and janitorial services; car washes, and 
beauty and nail salons.”181 In fact, “[m]ost low-wage workers will 
become victims of wage theft at some point in their careers.”182 
Low-wage workers are also much more likely to feel the effects 
of wage theft183 and much less likely to have the same resources as 
Voris to recover their stolen wages.184 Because of the lengthy duration 
of the wage claim and collections process, many workers suffer 
serious economic harm as a result.185 Several victims interviewed for 
the NELP Report reported going without food or medicine, or being 
 
 179. Id. at 300 (citing David Cooper & Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions from Workers’ 
Paychecks Each Year, ECON. POL’Y INST. 10, tbl.1 (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/125116.pdf) (other citation omitted). 
 180. See generally Lampert, 446 P.3d at 299–304 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (discussing the plight 
of wage theft that many California workers experience). 
 181. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 182. Hallett, supra note 4, at 99. “[W]omen, minorities, and those without legal authorization 
to work in the United States are particularly vulnerable.” Id.; see, e.g., Stephen Lee, Policing Wage 
Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 656 (2014) (“Like other day laborers, 
Nemelio Martinez waits at a parking lot every morning seeking work. One day he is hired to 
perform some landscaping work, to cut lawns for eight hours. At the end of the day, Martinez 
approaches the employer to receive his eighty dollars in payment. The employer begs off and 
promises to return the next day to hire him again. He will pay him then, he promises. Martinez 
never sees him again. . . . This is wage theft.”). 
 183. See Cho et al., supra note 1, at 6. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. 
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unable to pay their bills or rent.186 And in many instances, “workers 
face[] retaliation from their employers after filing wage claims.”187 
Employers have “lowered wages, fired [workers], or threatened to call 
the police or immigration enforcement after learning that workers had 
filed a wage claim or lawsuit.”188 Worse yet, even if workers are able 
to obtain judgments against their employers, it is often another uphill 
battle to collect on those judgments.189 
Take van driver, Bin Wu, for example.190 In April 2012, Bin Wu 
and five other employees filed claims with the California Labor 
Commissioner, accusing their employer, American Airporter Shuttle 
Inc. (“American Airporter”), of numerous wage violations.191 In 2016, 
the Labor Commissioner ordered American Airporter and its CEO, 
Phillip Achilles (“Achilles”), to pay $220,457 for those violations: 
$212,407 for stolen wages to the employees, plus $8,050 in civil 
penalties to the state.192 American Airporter and Achilles contested the 
findings in San Francisco Superior Court but did nothing to advance 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 4 (“N.P., a janitorial worker who earned $8.00 per hour” was unable to collect 
“$5,000 in unpaid wages . . . from her employer” despite winning a judgment. As a result, she 
explained: “I fell behind on rent. I borrowed money. I was unable to give my kids everything they 
needed. I had to leave my place and rent a smaller unit. I had to get another job. I felt upset and 
powerless not to collect the wages I was owed.”). 
 190. See Wolfe, supra note 2. 
 191. Id. These violations included failure to pay California’s minimum wage, failure to pay 
overtime wages, failure to provide meal breaks, and failure to provide itemized wage statements. 
Findings and Order at 2, In re Am. Airporter Shuttle, Inc., Case No. 35-123104-T-565 (Cal. Dep’t 
Indus. Rels. May 3, 2016) [hereinafter Findings and Order In re American Airporter]. According 
to Wu’s testimony, American Airporter would encourage him to work through thirteen-hour days 
with no meal break. Instead, the company asked him to eat his lunch while he waited for passengers. 
See id. at 14. No one at the company told Wu he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal period before 
the end of the fifth hour and a second meal period if he worked more than ten hours in a day. Id. 
The airport shuttle company also classified Wu as an independent contractor—which exempted 
them from wage regulations—even though Wu was not allowed to refuse assignments. Id. at 15. 
Wu confirmed he signed an Independent Contractor agreement, but he did not understand what that 
meant because the contract was in English and Wu only speaks Mandarin Chinese. Id.; Wolfe, 
supra note 2. 
 192. Findings and Order In re American Airporter, supra note 191, at 44; see Letter from 
Melvin Yee, Att’y, Cal. Lab. Comm’r, to Thomas Murphy, The Murphy Tr. et al. (Nov. 16, 
2017), https://www.fairwarning.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Achilles-Demand-Letter-
Fraudulent-Transfer.pdf [hereinafter Achilles Demand Letter]. 
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the plea for the next two years.193 During this period, Achilles “worked 
secretly to hide his assets.”194 
In 2017, “the Labor Commissioner discovered that Achilles was 
trying to sell a building he owned in downtown San Francisco”—
allegedly worth over five million dollars—to evade payment of the 
Labor Code violations.195 When the state tried to put a lien on the 
property, Achilles transferred the building to a shell company for no 
value and encumbered the property with significant debt.196 By doing 
so, Achilles rendered himself insolvent and unable to pay the wages 
he stole from Bin Wu and the other American Airporter employees.197 
The Labor Commissioner sued Achilles in 2018 to undo the 
fraudulent transfer.198 After the parties came to a settlement agreement 
that Achilles soon breached, the court granted the Labor 
Commissioner’s motion to enforce the settlement through a sheriff’s 
sale, or public auction, of the property and entered judgment in April 
2020.199 Achilles timely appealed.200 As of December 2020—over 
eight years after he first filed his claim against American Airporter—
Bin Wu has not recovered his stolen wages.201 
According to the NELP Report, only 17 percent of California 
workers who prevailed in their wage claims before the Labor 
Commissioner and received judgments between 2008 and 2011 were 
able to recover any payment at all.202 During that same period, the 
 
 193. Wolfe, supra note 2; see Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate at 1, Am. Airporter Shuttle, 
Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., No. CPF-16-515101 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2016), 
https://www.fairwarning.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Achilles-Writ-of-Mandate.pdf. 
 194. Wolfe, supra note 2. 
 195. Id.; see Achilles Demand Letter, supra note 192; Complaint at 7, Lab. Comm’r of 
California v. Achilles, No. CGC-18-571050 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Achilles 
Complaint]. 
 196. Wolfe, supra note 2; Achilles Complaint, supra note 195, at 7–8. 
 197. Wolfe, supra note 2. 
 198. Id.; Achilles Complaint, supra note 195, at 1. 
 199. Achilles, No. CGC-18-571050, at 1–2; Order Granting Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement at 1, Achilles, No. CGC-18-571050. 
 200. See Notice of Appeal at 1, Achilles, CGC-18-571050. 
 201. Register of Actions, Labor Commissioner of the State of California v. Phillip Achilles et 
al., SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF S.F., https://webapps.sftc.org/ci/CaseInfo.dll?CaseNum=C
GC18571050&SessionID=746079C205D0492F704CCACFBE8B162CAEF49A4B (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2021). The last update in the “Register of Actions” on the County of San Francisco’s 
Superior Court website is that on September 24, 2020, the appeal record was certified to the court 
of appeal. Id. 
 202. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 13–14 (“Between 2008 and 2011, 18,683 workers prevailed in 
their claims for unpaid wages before the [Labor Commissioner]. Only 3,084, or 17 percent—less 
than 1 in 5 recovered any money at all.”). 
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Labor Commissioner issued awards for “unpaid wages of more than 
$282 million . . . , [but] workers were able to collect [only] $42 million 
[from their employer]—roughly 15 percent.”203 Several workers 
interviewed by NELP “expressed regret for [even] invest[ing] time in 
the wage claim process.”204 One worker said, “although I won, I ended 
up losing, because I spent a lot of time and money on my wage claim, 
but walked away with nothing.”205 
Wage theft causes severe economic distress on workers and their 
families, but it also imposes significant costs on California’s 
economy.206 When employers fail to pay their employees, the state 
loses revenue in payroll taxes, and fewer dollars circulate to local 
businesses.207 Consequently, wage theft hurts communities by 
“stunting economic recovery, . . . limiting local sales tax collections, 
and diminishing opportunities for local economic development.”208 
While it certainly hurts individuals who have their wages stolen, wage 
theft also hurts the entire community.209 
The dissent’s priority was providing all workers, not just Voris, 
with adequate remedies to combat wage theft—and rightfully so.210 
Low-wage workers are often the ones impacted most by wage theft, 
and the road to recovering their stolen wages is long and difficult.211 
While there is no promise that allowing a conversion claim for the 
nonpayment of wages would speed up the process or guarantee 
recovery, it would equip workers with another remedy at their disposal 
to combat wage theft.212 Further, it “may also help victims of wage 
theft and society as a whole by better aligning employers’ incentives 
 
 203. Id. at 2. 
 204. Id. at 6. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 5. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See generally Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 299–304 (Cal. 2019) (Cuéllar, J., 
dissenting) (“This may also help victims of wage theft and society as a whole by better aligning 
employers’ incentives with the full extent of the individual and social costs associated with the 
conversion of unpaid wages.”). 
 211. See Cho et al., supra note 1, at 6. 
 212. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 304 (Cuellar, J., dissenting) (“The most reasonable inference is 
that these legislative remedies ‘were meant to supplement, not supplant . . . , existing . . . remedies, 
in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their . . . rights.’” (omissions in 
original) (quoting Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1990))). 
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with the full extent of the individual and social costs associated with 
the conversion of unpaid wages.”213 
2.  Duplicating Existing Remedies 
While the majority acknowledged the issue of wage theft and how 
important it was for employees to receive prompt compensation,214 it 
was more concerned with duplicating existing legislative remedies.215 
Its reluctance to duplicate remedies is in part because a conversion 
claim for the nonpayment of wages does not “fit[] well with the 
traditional understanding of the tort.”216 Moreover, while the majority 
believed conversion would not add anything new to the remedial 
scheme, a conversion claim would still come with certain features 
inherent to the tort—i.e., strict liability and punitive damages.217 The 
majority was concerned those features would punish not only the 
unscrupulous employers, but also employers who made a good-faith 
mistake.218 
Conversion is a strict liability tort and “does not require bad faith, 
knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant 
have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her 
rightful possession.”219 As a result, “conversion liability for unpaid 
wages would not only reach those who act[ed] in bad faith, but also 
those who made good-faith mistakes—for example, an employer who 
fails to pay the correct amount in wages because of a glitch in the 
payroll system or a clerical error.”220 The majority believed it was 
important to distinguish between employers who acted in bad faith and 
employers who made a good-faith mistake.221 However, it is difficult 
to make that distinction when the conversion tort does not require a 
finding of fault to impose liability.222 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 299 (majority opinion) (“The full and prompt payment of wages is of 
fundamental importance to the welfare of both workers and the State of California.”). 
 215. See id. at 295. 
 216. Id. at 298. 
 217. See id. at 295–96. 
 218. Id. at 296. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id.; see also id. at 290 (“Notably absent from [the elements of conversion] is any 
element of wrongful intent or motive; in California, conversion is a ‘strict liability tort.’”). 
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Conversion also “authoriz[es] the recovery of consequential, 
emotional distress, and, most importantly, punitive damages.”223 
While Voris viewed those possible awards as advantages that would 
“enhance deterrence of intentional wage nonpayment,” the majority 
opined that conversion is an “awfully blunt tool” to deter intentional 
misconduct because of how difficult it would be to limit conversion 
liability to only certain bad actors.224 Even though punitive damages 
may only be imposed if there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, the majority 
contended that “it is not unusual for juries to find malice supporting 
punitive damage awards in run-of-the-mill wage suits.”225 Further, 
even if a defendant is not held liable for punitive damages, “they could 
still be held to pay for the value of the converted property and interest, 
plus the value of the plaintiff’s time and money expended in pursuit of 
the unpaid wages.”226 
The majority feared that given the nature of the conversion tort, a 
conversion claim for unpaid wages “would reach well beyond those 
individual corporate officers who withhold wages to punish disfavored 
employees or who deliberately run down corporate coffers to evade 
wage judgments” and punish employers acting in good faith.227 
Understandably so—the term “wage theft” itself already comes with a 
negative connotation.228 Critics believe that the term unfairly vilifies 
business owners because “wage and hours laws are a complicated 
morass that are difficult for even the savviest employer to understand, 
and that technical violations of the law can lead to harsh penalties.”229 
And of course, not every instance of wage theft is intentional or 
unscrupulous.230 Indeed, there is a difference between a company 
owner who misappropriated funds or deliberately evaded an adverse 
judgment and a company owner who was also wiped out when the 
company went under—and perhaps that distinction should be 
 
 223. Id. at 295. 
 224. Id. at 295–96. 
 225. Id. at 296. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 298–99. 
 228. Hallett, supra note 4, at 99. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
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recognized.231 However, the traditional application of the conversion 
tort would not recognize such a distinction.232 
Because a conversion claim for unpaid wages would come with 
undesirable features inherent to the conversion tort, like strict liability 
and punitive damages, the majority found “no sufficient justification 
for layering tort liability on top of the extensive existing remedies.”233 
C.  Not All Victims Can Recover Their Stolen Wages Under the 
Existing Remedial Scheme 
Unlike the dissent, which considered victims of wage theft 
collectively, the majority took an arguably narrower approach and 
focused only on the present case. The majority is correct that the 
existing provisions in the Labor Code provides sufficient remedies for 
Voris, especially after the enactment of Senate Bill 588.234 However, 
the majority opinion overlooked situations beyond this case where the 
ability to maintain a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages is 
crucial for an employee to recover their stolen wages.235 
1.  Voris Can Recover Without Maintaining a Conversion Claim for 
His Unpaid Wages 
While the remedies in existence were inadequate when Voris first 
filed suit, that was no longer true by the time his case reached the 
California Supreme Court.236 At the time of the court’s ruling, 
allowing a conversion claim for unpaid wages would largely duplicate 
existing remedies for Voris; his conversion claim against Lampert, an 
individual who is “responsible for their companies’ evasion of their 
established wage obligations,” would likely provide no better 
restitution than a contract claim or the Labor Code.237 
 
 231. See infra Section IV.D. 
 232. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 295–96. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See infra Section IV.C.1; S.B. 588, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); Lampert, 446 P.3d 
at 297–98. 
 235. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 236. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 297 (“[A]fter Voris filed this suit, the Legislature enacted Senate 
Bill No. 588 (Senate Bill 588) to address the precise problem Voris alleges.”); id. at 302 (Cuéllar, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he nonconversion remedies in existence at the time Voris filed suit were 
inadequate.”). 
 237. See id. at 296; Cal. S.B. 588. 
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As mentioned, Senate Bill 588 added section 588.1 to the Labor 
Code in 2015.238 Under Labor Code section 558.1, 
[a]ny employer or other person acting on behalf of an 
employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any 
provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of 
work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or 
violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 
1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer 
for such violation.239  
The code clarifies that another “‘person acting on behalf of an 
employer’ is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director, 
officer, or managing agent of the employer.”240 Individual officers are 
also subject to civil and criminal penalties for failing to observe Senate 
Bill 588’s enforcement laws.241 
If Senate Bill 588 were in effect at the time of his initial lawsuit, 
Voris could have gone after Lampert personally to satisfy the 
judgments against the startups under Labor Code section 558.1.242 He 
would not have needed to allege Lampert converted his unpaid wages 
because even without alter ego liability, Voris could hold Lampert 
liable in place of PropPoint, Liquiddium, and Sportfolio for the wage 
violations.243 Although Senate Bill 588 does not apply retroactively, 
its enforcement-related provisions do apply to Voris’s existing 
judgments against the startups.244 
 
 238. Cal. S.B. 588; CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. 
Sess.); see supra Section III.A.3. 
 239. CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(a). 
 240. Id. § 558.1(b). 
 241. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298; Cal. S.B. 588; CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1. Senate Bill 588 also 
added Labor Code section 238, which requires companies to post a bond with the state to satisfy 
unpaid judgments or halt all business in California; if an employer were continue doing business 
without posting required bond, any “person acting on behalf of [the] employer” is subject to a civil 
penalty of $2,500. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 238(f)). Further, if an 
“‘owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer’ fails to observe a stop order issued 
by the [Labor] Commissioner,” the individual is guilty of a misdemeanor and can face up to 60 
days in jail and a fine of up to $10,000. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 238.1(b)). 
 242. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1. 
 243. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296–97. 
 244. See id. at 298 n.18. 
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2.  However, Victims of Wage Theft Caused by Third-Party Bad 
Actors Cannot Recover Under the Existing Remedial Scheme 
The Labor Code enables Voris to go after Lampert personally for 
his unpaid wages without maintaining a conversion claim, but not all 
victims of wage theft can recover under the existing remedial scheme. 
In an amicus curiae brief filed in support of Voris, a group of non-
profit legal services and public policy organizations dedicated to 
representing victims of wage theft245 noted that workers have “only a 
patchwork of remedies” available to recover their stolen wages, and 
“[r]emedies are particularly scarce and ineffective when actions by 
third parties interfere with workers’ ability to collect unpaid 
wages.”246 Although Labor Code section 558.1 holds some individuals 
liable, it is “only for underlying wage and hour violations” and “only 
by [those] acting on behalf of the employer.”247 The available 
remedies do not consider “separate acts by persons outside the 
employer-debtor context” that could “deprive employers of funds to 
pay wages, or otherwise render collection impossible.”248 
Take, for example, an employee who has her wages improperly 
garnished by a third-party payroll processor.249 The employee cannot 
go after her employer because her employer is not the one withholding 
her wages. However, the employee would also be unable to go after 
the third-party payroll processor under Labor Code section 558.1 
because it is not an “other person acting on behalf of an employer.”250 
The payroll processor is not “a natural person who is an owner, 
 
 245. Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff and Appellant at 1, Lampert, 446 
P.3d 284 (No. S241812) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Voris]. 
 246. Id. at 10. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See, e.g., McGown v. Silverman & Borenstein, PLLC, No. 13-cv-748-RGA/MPT, 2014 
WL 545903, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014) (upholding conversion claim against third-party collection 
agency for improperly garnishing an employee’s wages but dismissing the case for lack of 
jurisdiction). 
 250. Michaela Goldstein & Michael Campbell, Managers Beware: Can You Be Held 
Personally Liable for Wage and Hour Violations?, LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/12/articles/california-employment-
legislation/managers-personally-liable-wage-hour-violations/ (discussing the application of the 
“other person” language of section 558.1 to managing agents of the employer (not third parties)); 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) (“Any employer 
or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any 
provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial 
Welfare Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194, 
or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation.”). 
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director, officer, or managing agent of the employer.”251 It is simply a 
third-party entity, but it still plays a major role in depriving the 
employee of her earned wages.252 
The majority opinion briefly acknowledged such situations in a 
footnote: “Many of the jurisdictions that have recognized conversion 
claims involving wages have done so in meaningfully different 
contexts, for instance where an employee’s wages were garnished or 
assigned to a third party.”253 Although the majority recognized that 
situations involving third-parties were “different” than the present 
case, it did not suggest that a conversion claim should remain available 
to address “different contexts.”254 Rather, the majority opinion may 
undermine the availability of conversion in those instances because it 
broadly holds that in California, an individual cannot maintain a 
conversion claim based on the nonpayment of wages.255 As a result, 
workers do not have a remedy to recover their stolen wages in 
situations where the nonpayment is caused by persons outside the 
employer-debtor context because those actors “remain outside the 
purview of the remedial scheme.”256 
D.  A Conversion Claim for Unpaid Wages Should Be Available in 
Limited Circumstances When Two Elements Are Met 
To help all victims of wage theft, not just Voris, a conversion 
claim for unpaid wages should not be categorically barred. Instead, it 
should be available to workers in limited circumstances to help 
recover their stolen wages. Voris made his own attempt to narrow the 
liability of a conversion claim for unpaid wages, arguing for a “‘case 
by case consideration’ of factors that inform th[e] court’s recognition 
of tort duties, such as the foreseeability of harm and the nexus between 
the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.”257 However, the 
majority rejected those factors because Voris “fail[ed] to explain how 
the[] factors would impose any meaningful limits in the context of a 
claim for wage nonpayment, which invariably and directly injures 
 
 251. CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(b) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘other person acting 
on behalf of an employer’ is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or 
managing agent of the employer.”). 
 252. See McGown, 2014 WL 545903, at *1. 
 253. Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 289 n.6 (Cal. 2019). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 286. 
 256. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Voris, supra note 245, at 10. 
 257. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296 (citing J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65–66 (Cal. 1979)). 
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employees.”258 The majority believed “it would be difficult if not 
impossible to formulate a rule that would assure that only ‘deserving’ 
cases give rise to tort relief.”259 Nevertheless, this Section attempts to 
do so anyway. 
Instead of looking at the foreseeability of harm or nexus between 
the conduct and the injury, a conversion claim for unpaid wages 
should be limited to situations where (1) the court can ascertain the 
specific sum of money that is owed; and (2) the employee can show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant (the employer, 
employer’s officers, or a third party) acted with malice, oppression, or 
fraud in withholding the employee’s wages. Unlike the factors Voris 
suggested, the two elements proposed here address the majority’s 
concerns about the conversion tort head on; those concerns are what 
influenced the majority to hold that conversion is not the appropriate 
fit to address wage nonpayment.260 
1.  An Ascertainable, Specific Sum of Money 
The first element—situations where the court can ascertain the 
specific sum of money that is owed—is similar to the existing rule that 
“money cannot be the subject of an action for conversion unless a 
specific sum capable of identification is involved.”261 In fact, it is the 
dissent’s interpretation of what that rule means: “That the unpaid 
wages may be commingled with the employer’s general funds does 
not disqualify them as property that may be converted, so long as the 
sum owed is specific and definite.”262 As long as the court can 
ascertain the specific sum of money that is owed, it should not matter 
if the unpaid wages are still in the employer’s possession or 
commingled with the employer’s funds; the wages are “a specific sum 
capable of identification.”263 
2.  Clear and Convincing Evidence That the Defendant Acted with 
Malice, Oppression, or Fraud in Withholding the Employee’s Wages 
The second element—situations where the employee can show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, 
 
 258. Id. (citing In re Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 740 (Cal. 1948)). 
 259. Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 399 (Cal. 1988)). 
 260. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 261. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 291 (quoting Haigler v. Donnelly, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (Cal. 1941)). 
 262. Id. at 301 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 263. See id. at 291 (majority opinion) (quoting Haigler, 117 P.2d at 335). 
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oppression, or fraud in withholding their wages—addresses the 
majority’s concerns that as a strict liability tort, a conversion claim for 
unpaid wages could potentially reach defendants acting in good faith 
and allow for punitive damages.264 By requiring the employee to show 
that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud in 
withholding the wages, this element effectively eliminates the strict 
liability aspect of the tort.265 The heightened “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard266 would further minimize the chances that 
conversion liability would reach employers, officers, or third parties 
“who make good-faith mistakes” because the standard “requires a high 
probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial 
doubt.”267 
Moreover, this additional hurdle ensures that only bad actors are 
faced with punitive damages. Punitive damages also require a showing 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with 
oppression, fraud, or malice.268 By requiring the same showing to even 
maintain an action for the conversion of unpaid wages and recover 
compensatory damages, defendants who acted in good faith would not 
be liable for punitive damages because they would not be liable under 
conversion at all. The majority worried that it was not uncommon for 
juries to award punitive damages, even in “run-of-the-mill wage 
suits,” but adopting this second element would mean there will no 
longer be “run-of-the-mill” suits for the conversion of unpaid 
wages.269 Even if the same concern with the jury remains, in 
California, jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.270 
 
 264. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 265. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296 (“[C]onversion is a strict liability tort . . . [that] does not 
require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have 
intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.”). 
 266. See Jerald M. Montoya, Note, Requiring Clear and Convincing Proof in Tort Claims 
Involving Recently Recovered Repressed Memories, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 173, 198 (1995) (“Although 
the burden of proof in most cases is a preponderance of the evidence, many jurisdictions require a 
party to prove the elements of certain civil claims with clear and convincing proof.”). 
 267. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296; In re John M., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 284 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(quoting In re Luke M., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
 268. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 290 (“Punitive damages are recoverable upon a showing of malice, 
fraud, or oppression.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (Deering 2021) (“In an action for the breach of 
an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual 
damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”). 
 269. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 295–96. 
 270. People v. Sanchez, 29 P.3d 209, 220–21 (Cal. 2001) (citing People v. Scott, 246 Cal. Rptr. 
406, 408 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
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The majority was also concerned that even if the defendants are 
not held liable for punitive damages, they could still be forced to pay 
for the converted wages, interest, and the value of the plaintiff’s time 
and money in pursuing the wages.271 That would no longer be an issue 
if the employee can show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud in withholding their 
wages. If the defendant did act unscrupulously, he should be liable for 
interest and the value of the plaintiff’s time and money, on top of the 
stolen wages. In fact, he should also be liable for punitive damages.272 
The second element distinguishes between defendants acting in good 
faith and those who deliberately commit wage theft—what the 
majority worried a conversion claim based on the nonpayment of 
wages would be unable to do.273 
 
Finally, allowing a conversion claim for unpaid wages would not 
“collapse the well-established distinction between a contractual 
obligation to pay and the tortious conversion of monetary interests.”274 
There is already so much overlap between contract and tort law,275 
and, as the dissent noted, other jurisdictions have recognized wage 
conversion claims without any adverse effects.276 Therefore, a 
conversion claim for unpaid wages should not be categorically barred, 
especially when it does not “duplicate [existing] remedies” for victims 
of wage theft that cannot recover under those existing remedies.277 
Instead, conversion should be available, with limitations, to 
supplement the legislative scheme.278 
 
 271. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296. 
 272. See id. at 290 (“Punitive damages are recoverable upon a showing of malice, fraud, or 
oppression.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising 
from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover 
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”). 
 273. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 274. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 292. 
 275. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 100, at 87–94 (discussing how when a party to a contract 
is wronged, courts are now much less inclined to follow traditional contract law, and more likely 
to just apply tort principles to address the wrongdoing); id. at 87 (“[T]he theory of tort into which 
contract is being reabsorbed is itself a much more expansive theory of liability than was the theory 
of tort from which contract was artificially separated a hundred years ago.”). 
 276. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 302 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 277. Id. at 295 (majority opinion); see supra Section IV.C.2. 
 278. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 304 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Voris v. Lampert held that an individual cannot maintain a 
conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.279 Instead of the sound 
application of precedent, both the majority and the dissent were 
heavily influenced by different public policy concerns.280 The 
dissenting opinion addressed the issue of wage theft and wanted to 
give victims a variety of options to recover their stolen wages by 
allowing conversion to supplement existing legislative remedies.281 
The majority opinion, however, was concerned that a conversion 
claim would add nothing to existing remedies, except for undesirable 
features inherent to the conversion tort.282 While the majority is 
correct that Voris would be able to reach Lampert without maintaining 
a conversion claim, it overlooked instances of wage theft where the 
bad actor is not covered under the existing remedial scheme.283 To 
address the majority’s concerns about the conversion tort, and to 
protect all victims of wage theft, a conversion claim for unpaid wages 
should be available to employees in situations where (1) the court can 
ascertain the specific sum of money that is owed; and (2) the employee 
can show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted 
with malice, oppression, or fraud in withholding the employee’s 
wages.284 
Alternatively, the Legislature should expand on the Labor Code 
and address the issue of third-party actors outside the employer-debtor 
context who cannot be held liable under the existing remedial scheme. 
After all, the California Supreme Court recognizes and upholds “the 
Legislature’s authority to adopt new solutions to combat [wage theft],” 
and “various Labor Code provisions illustrate [how] the Legislature 
can craft rights and remedies that target those . . . who withhold wages 
willfully and repeatedly, and who strategically evade wage 
judgments.”285 But, regardless of whether the courts or the Legislature 
 
 279. Id. at 286 (majority opinion). 
 280. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
 281. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 282. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 283. See supra Section IV.C. 
 284. See supra Section IV.D. 
 285. Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 297, 299 (Cal. 2019). That has also proven true in other 
areas of labor and employment law, such as Assembly Bill 5, which expanded on landmark case 
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018) (holding workers are 
presumptively employees and the burden is on the employer to establish that a worker is an 
independent contractor who is not subject to California’s wage protections); Assemb. B. 5, 2019–
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undertake the duty, all victims of wage theft should be able to recover 
their stolen wages in a timely manner. After all, “[t]he full and prompt 
payment of wages is of fundamental importance to the welfare of both 
workers and the State of California.”286 
 
 
2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to codify the 
decision in the Dynamex case and clarify its application.” (emphasis added)); see also Cal. Sec’y 
of State, Proposition 22, OFF. VOTER INFO. GUIDE FOR 2020 GEN. ELECTION, https://voterguide.
sos.ca.gov/propositions/22/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (an exemption from A.B. 5 for 
app-based drivers that passed in California in November 2020). 
 286. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 297, 299. 
